Abstract
Introduction
Synchronous systems are characterized by certain communication [3] : any two non-crashed processes can send each other messages and it is guaranteed that each of these messages is delivered to the destination process within some a priori known maximum time ¡ Ñ Ü . This allows processes of synchronous systems to communicate by measuring the passage of time on their local clocks. For example, consider that a correct process Ô broadcasts every time units an "alive"-message: when a process Õ has been waiting for an alive-message from Ô for more than ·¡ Ñ Ü time units, Õ knows that Ô has crashed. Indeed, if Ô were alive, it would send its "alive"-message every time units and the certain communication guarantee would ensure that Õ would receive a new "alive"-message from Ô within ·¡ Ñ Ü time units of the reception of the previous "alive"-message from Ô.
In most practical distributed systems, communication is not certain, e.g. one has to consider that some messages are delivered late or not at all. Even if one uses a distributed real-time system with redundant communication channels, one cannot necessarily assume that communication is certain. There always exists a non-zero probability È that some message -even when messages are sent via redundant channels -is delivered late or is dropped. For safety critical systems designed assuming certain communication, a violation of the certain communication property might result in a safety failure. Hence, such a safety critical system might only be safe with a probability of at most ½ È . If ½ È is too small, one cannot assume that communication is certain. See [19] for a discussion of this coverage problem of system assumptions.
In systems characterized by uncertain communication, it is not obvious that processes can communicate by measuring the passage of time on their local clocks, since if a process sends a message to another process, the underlying communication system does not guarantee delivery within a bounded time. We show that communication by time is also possible in systems characterized by uncertain communication.
One important mechanism for communication by time is the time locking mechanism (see Figure 1 ; [12] ): a process Ô guarantees not to change the value of some variable Î for at least, say, ÐØ time units after Ô has sent a message Ñ to another process Õ. In other words, Ô locks Î for ÐØ time units. Process Õ knows at the reception of Ñ that Ô will not change Î for ÐØ Ø ´Ñµ time units, where Ø ´Ñµ is the transmission delay of Ñ. An important property is that Ô can change Î after ÐØ time units (Ô can measure this with its local clock) without having to wait for a message from Õ. We will describe in Section 5 how one can use time locking in an election algorithm to make sure that at any time there is at most one leader. Note that, to use time locking, a process has to be able to calculate an a posteriori upper bound on the one-way transmission delay of messages. In this paper , we describe a fail-aware datagram service that computes such a bound for processes. Î for the next ÐØ Ø ´Ñµ time units. Process Ô learnsby using its local clock to measure ÐØ time units -that it is authorized to change the value of Î .
Let us sketch how time locking can be used to switch a fail-safe system to a safe mode when unmasked communication failures occur. Consider a distributed system that controls a railway-crossing. This system is safe as long as the gates are closed whenever a train is in the crossing. Hence, by lowering the gates this system can be switched to its safe mode. Such a switch to a safe mode might be necessary to guarantee the safety of the system if communication with remote sensors (that are detecting the arrival of trains) is lost. Consider that there are two processes Ô and Õ. Process Ô determines whether the system has to be switched to a safe mode, e.g. Õ determines whether sufficient sensor data is available to keep the gates open. The task of process Õ is to switch the system to a safe mode on behalf of Õ, i.e. it closes the gates. If Õ becomes "disconnected" from Ô, Õ has to assume that it is not safe anymore to keep the gates open. Using time locking we can achieve that as follows (see Figure 2 ). Process Ô sends periodically messages to Õ saying that the system is safe for the next ÐØ time units. Informally, these safe-messages say "don't switch the system to a safe mode for the next ÐØ time units". If Ô does not succeed to let Õ constantly know that the system is safe (e.g. due to a dropped message), Õ will switch the system to a safe mode. process Ô lets Õ know if the system is safe. As soon as Õ does not know that the system is safe, it switches the system to a safe mode.
The time locking mechanism uses an a posteriori upper bound on the transmission delay of messages to make sure that a receiver does not use information after the information has expired. We shall explain this in the context of the railway-crossing example. To ensure that the system stays safe, Õ has to be able to determine the age of a message.
Consider the scenario depicted in Figure 3 . At first, the system is safe and Õ knows that due to Ô's safe-messages. However, after some time Ô stops sending safe-messages because the system is not guaranteed to be safe anymore. Process Õ has in this case to switch the system to a safe mode. Process Ô might even send "switch"-messages to let Õ know that Õ has to switch the system to a safe mode. Note these switch-messages are actually redundant. Now, consider that Õ does not receive the switch messages (they are dropped by the network) and instead, Õ receives some very slow safe-messages. If Õ would not determine the transmission delay of a message, Õ might wrongly determine that the system is still safe and keep the gates up. However, since the time locking mechanism uses an upper bound on the transmission delay of messages, Õ ignores all slow safe-messages. to ensure the safety of the system, process Õ has to be able to detect slow messages. Otherwise, due to the arrival of a slow safemessage, Õ might assume that the system is safe in cases where Õ is supposed to switch the system to a safe mode.
In this paper , we describe a fail-aware datagram service that calculates an upper bound on the one-way transmission delay of every message it delivers. While many clients will use this upper bound, some might just use a more abstract classification of the transmission delay of messages: the service classifies delivered messages as either "slow" or "fast". We showed in [9] that classifying messages as either "slow" or "fast" can be used to dynamically adapt time-outs, i.e. processes do not have to use fixed time-outs -instead, the system can adapt the time-outs on the fly.
The fail-aware datagram service is a basic distributed communication service that we have successfully used in the design and implementation of several other distributed services such as a clock synchronization service [8] , a local leader election service for partitionable systems [15] and a node membership service [11] (see Figure 4 ). Others have used this fail-aware datagram service to build a fully automated train control system [7] .
We propose a specification for this service and a protocol that implements it efficiently using local, unsynchronized hardware clocks: a hardware clock proceeds with about the same speed as real-time but the difference between the values of two hardware clocks can be arbitrary. Hence, also the difference between a hardware clock and realtime can be arbitrary.
To illustrate how the fail-aware datagram service supports communication by time, we describe a simple leader election protocol. In particular, we show how the fail-aware datagram service can be used to ensure that at any point in real-time there exists at most one leader. We also demonstrate the use of a fail-aware datagram service in the context of process control applications: we show how to detect out-of-date sensor information using the fail-aware datagram service.
Related Work
Many synchronous distributed services are specified by using safety properties, i.e. properties that should always hold. To implement a safety property, it is often necessary that one has certain communication. Fail-awareness [10, 12] is a general method for extending the safety properties of a fault-tolerant synchronous service by an exception indicator so that the new, extended service becomes implementable in distributed systems with uncertain communication but with access to local hardware clocks. The idea is that the indicator tells a server and its clients whether some safety property currently holds or if it might be violated because the system has suffered "too many failures". More concretely, a fail-aware distributed service has to provide for each safety property Ë an indicator Á Ë such that whenever Á Ë is true, Ë holds. Therefore, if Ë does not hold at some point Ø, indicator Ë has to be false at Ø. A fail-aware service is required to set its indicators to true, whenever the failure frequency is below an a priori specified bound. This requirement makes sure that a failaware service can indicate a violation of a safety property only if there is a good reason for that, i.e. the occurrence of too many failures.
The indicators of a service allow a client to see whether the safety properties the client depends upon are currently valid. An indicator might indicate a violation of a safety property because some process suffers a performance failure (i.e. the process has missed a deadline), a process has crashed, a message has been dropped (i.e. has suffered an omission failure), or a message has suffered a performance failure (i.e. its transmission delay is greater than some given threshold AE). sometimes it is advantageous that processes also receive slow messages. Hence, we classify messages as "slow" or "fast" and leave it to the clients whether they drop "slow" messages.
The fail-aware datagram protocol we propose is implementable on top of a conventional datagram service, like UDP [18] . The calculation of the upper bound on the transmission delay of a message relies on the main idea which underlies probabilistic remote clock reading [1] , namely that by measuring round-trip message delays one can calculate upper bounds on one-way transmission delays.
Each message that the fail-aware datagram service delivers is classified as either "slow" or "fast". Such a classification of a message can also be performed with the help of internally synchronized clocks. Even though internal clock synchronization can be achieved in asynchronous systems by probabilistic methods [1, 10] , the solution proposed in this paper (which does not use synchronized clocks) achieves a better precision since we only need to have "pairwise synchronized clocks" in the sense that any two "connected" processes know approximately the distance between their own two hardware clocks. The fail-aware datagram service also allows the correct classification of messages sent between processes in different network partitions although the clocks of these processes might be out of sync. Note that unless in each network partition there exists an access to a reference time provider, such as a GPS receiver [6] , one cannot guarantee that the deviation between all clocks is bounded. We actually use the fail-aware datagram service in a fail-aware clock synchronization algorithm to read remote clocks [13] .
The fail-aware datagram service is the foundation of all other fail-aware services we have designed and implemented (see Figure 4 ; [13] ). It has been vital in the design of all theses services because they all need to reject slow messages. We use the fail-aware datagram service in partitionable systems to provide the abstraction of "clean partitions" in the sense that, even when slow messages from other partitions arrive, higher level protocols see non overlapping "logical partitions" without inter-partition communication (see [12] ). A fail-aware datagram service is used in a fully automated train control system [7] to help to detect slow messages that could cause the system to become unsafe.
Fail-Aware Datagrams
We address the problem of how to detect late messages by proposing a fail-aware datagram service that delivers a message as either "slow" or "fast". Processes can use this service to send each other messages. In the following we call such messages fail-aware messages (abbreviated by "fa-messages"). Say a process Ô sends an fa-message Ñ at real-time × to some process Õ ( Figure 5 ). The fail-aware datagram service allows a receiver to detect when the transmission delay of an fa-message was greater than some given threshold ¡. It is then up to the receiver to handle such a slow fa-message in a manner that makes sense at its level of abstraction [2] . the receiver may reject all slow fa-messages to ensure at its level of abstraction an omission failure semantics for its communication service.
Each client can choose an appropriate constant ¡ depending on the client's requirements. If a client is independent of the actual choice of ¡, the system might adapt ¡ dynamically to minimize the number of slow fa-messages (see [9] for why and where this is useful). For simplicity and since a dynamic adaptation of ¡ is orthogonal to the issues discussed in this paper, we assume in the following that ¡ is fixed. The intuition behind calculating the upper bound Ù ´Ñµ on the transmission delay Ø ´Ñµ of a fa-message Ñ is as follows (see Figure 6 ). One selects another message Ò that Ô has received from Õ before Ô sends Ñ to Õ. Process Õ might have received Ò several seconds before. In particular, Ô does not have to receive a message from Õ for every fa-message it sends to Õ. One message every couple seconds is typically sufficient. Assume for a moment that the hardware clocks proceed with the same speed as realtime. In this case we can use Õ's hardware clock to measure the time between the reception of Ñ and the sending of Ò ( in Figure 6 ) and we can use Ô's hardware clock to measure the time between the sending of Ñ and the reception of Ò ( ). Since the transmission delay of Ò plus Ñ is obviously´ µ ´ µ (if clocks proceed with the same speed as real-time), we can bound the transmission delay of Ñ by´ µ ´ µ. We will show how to improve the upper bound 1) when knowing a minimum transmission delay for Ò and 2) by selecting Ò appropriately in case we have multiple messages to choose from.
Timed Asynchronous System Model
The timed asynchronous system model [4] is an abstraction of the properties of most distributed systems encountered in practice, built out of a set of workstations con- nected by a LAN or WAN. The timed model makes very few assumptions about a system and hence, almost all practical distributed systems can be described as timed asynchronous systems. Since it makes such weak assumptions, any solution to a problem in the timed model can be used to solve the same problem in a practical distributed system. The timed model is however sufficiently strong to solve many practically relevant problems, such as clock synchronization, highly available leadership, membership, atomic broadcast and availability management [4] .
The timed model describes a distributed system as a finite set of processes È linked by an asynchronous datagram service. The datagram service provides primitives to transmit unicast and broadcast messages. A one-way time-out delay AE is defined for the transmission delays of messages: although there is no guarantee that a message will be delivered within AE time units, this one-way timeout is chosen so as to make the likelihood of a message being delivered within AE timeouts suitably high [2] . We say that a process receives a message Ñ in a timely manner iff the transmission delay of Ñ is at most AE. When the transmission delay of Ñ is greater than AE, we say that Ñ has suffered a performance failure or that Ñ is late [2] .
We assume that there exists a constant AE Ñ Ò that denotes the minimum message transmission delay: any message sent between two remote processes has a transmission delay of at least AE Ñ Ò time units. By "remote" we mean that the message is sent via a network. We will see later that the correctness of the upper bound calculated by the fail-aware datagram service depends on the correctness of AE Ñ Ò , i.e. if AE Ñ Ò is chosen too big, the calculated bounds might be too small. The safest choice is to assume that AE Ñ Ò ¼. However, we will see that the calculated upper bounds are getting tighter for AE Ñ Ò ¼. Another safe choice is to compute a lower bound for each message Ñ sent (or, received) by a computer Ô as follows: if is the maximum network bandwidth of Ô, × Þ ´Ñµ the size of Ñ in bits, the transmission delay of Ñ is at least × Þ ´Ñµ .
The asynchronous datagram service has an omission/performance failure semantics [2] : it can drop a message or it can fail to deliver a message in a timely manner, but the probability that it delivers corrupted messages is negligible. Broadcast messages allow asymmetric performance/omission failures: a process might receive a broadcast message Ñ in a timely manner, while another process might receive Ñ late or not at all.
The asynchronous datagram service satisfies the following requirements:
Validity: when a process Ô receives a message Ñ from Õ at some time Ø, then indeed there exists some earlier time × Ø such that Õ has sent Ñ to Ô at ×.
No-duplication: a process receives a message Ñ at most once, i.e. when message Ñ is delivered to process Õ at time ×, then there exists no other time Ø × such that the datagram service delivers Ñ to Õ at Ø too.
The process management service defines a scheduling time-out delay , meaning that a process is likely to react to any trigger event within time units (see [4] ). If Ô takes more than time units to react to a trigger event, it suffers a performance failure. We say that Ô is timely in an interval × Ø℄ iff at no point in × Ø℄ Ô is crashed and Ô does not suffer any performance failure in × Ø℄. We assume that processes have crash/performance failure semantics [2] : they can only suffer crash and performance failures. Processes can recover from crashes.
Two processes are said to be connected [5] in × Ø℄ iff they are timely in × Ø℄ and each message sent between them in × Ø AE℄ is delivered in a timely manner (see Figure 7) . We denote that Ô and Õ are connected in × Ø℄ by using the predicate connected(p,q,s,t). Processes have access to local hardware clocks with a bounded drift rate. Correct hardware clocks display strictly monotonically increasing values. We denote the local hardware clock of a process Ô by À Ô . For simplicity, we assume in this paper that we can neglect the granularity of a hardware clock: e.g. a clock has a resolution of ½ × or smaller. Hardware clocks are proceeding within a linear envelope of real-time: the drift rate of a correct hardware clock À Ô is bounded by an a priori given constant so that, for any interval × Ø℄:
An important assumption is that the hardware clock of any non-crashed process is correct. Informally, we require that we can neglect the probability that the drift rate of a hardware clock is not within ℄. Whether some failure probability is negligible depends on the stochastic requirements of an application [2, 19] . For non-critical applications, the use of a simple counter connected to a quartz oscillator might provide a sufficiently close approximation of a crash failure semantics, i.e. one can neglect the probability that any clock failure except clock crash failures occur. For safety critical applications, such an implementation might not be sufficient. However, one can use multiple oscillators and counters to make sure that the probability of any clock failure except a clock crash failure becomes negligible [14] .
For simplicity, we assume that a hardware clock does not recover from a crash. Hardware clocks do not have to be synchronized: the deviation À Ô´Ø µ À Õ´Ø µ between correct hardware clocks À Ô and À Õ is not assumed to be bounded.
For most quartz clocks available in modern computers, the maximum hardware clock drift rate is in the order of ½¼ to ½¼ . Since is such a small quantity, in what follows we neglect terms in the order of ¾ or higher.
In particular, we will equate´½ · µ ½ ´½ µ and ½ µ ½ ´½· µ. 
Leader Election Example
In this section, we show how the fail-aware datagram service can be used to implement a leader election protocol. For simplicity, we only describe a fragment of a leader election protocol, the full protocol being described in [15] . The leader problem can be specified using a safety property (S) and a timeliness property (T):
(S) at any real-time there exists at most one leader, and (T) if there exists a majority of processes connected in a real-time interval × × · Ä ℄, then there exists a process Ô such that Ô is leader for some time Ø ¾ × × · Ä ℄.
In this paper, we only address the issue of how to guarantee that at any time there exists at most one leader. All messages sent by the election protocol are fail-aware messages, i.e. are sent with a fail-aware datagram service. A process Ô that wants to become leader broadcasts an "election"-message to let the other processes know of its intention to become leader. After Ô has broadcasted an "election"-message, Ô must collect a majority of fast "support"-messages to become leader. A process Õ that supports Ô's election by sending a support-message to Ô, guarantees (using its local hardware clock) not to send a support-message to another process for the next, say, Ñ×Ø (maximum support time) real-time units (Figure 8 ). Thus, when process Ô receives a fast support-message from Õ, it knows that Õ will support Ô's election for at least the next Ñ×Ø ¡ time units. Process Ô can use its local hardware clock to guarantee that it stops using Õ's support message before it "expires": when Ô has received the fast supportmessage Ñ at local time Ì , Ô uses Ñ only as long as the following support condition is true: ×ÙÔÔÓÖØ´Øµ À Ô´Ø µ Ì ·´Ñ×Ø ¡µ´½ µ. The factor of´½ µ takes care of the drift rate of Ô's hardware clock, which is within · ℄. Since Ô knows that a majority of processes support it, and no process in that majority can support a process other than Ô for a known amount of time. It follows that Ô is the only leader that can exist for as long as Ô's support predicate evaluates to true for a majority of the processes. One of the main problems in the design of a leader election problem is that in some runs the processes cannot correctly decide if the current leader has crashed or is just very slow. An interesting feature of the sketched leader election protocol is that actually processes do not have to know if the current leader has crashed or is just slow. Process Õ knows that Ô will not use Õ's support for more than Ñ×Ø-¡ real-time units. Hence, it can send a support message to another process after waiting for at least Ñ×Ø(1+ ) local clock time units. In particular, when Õ would suspect that Ô has crashed, it could support (after Ñ×Ø(1+ ) local clock time units) another process without knowing for sure that Ô has crashed. This is an example of processes Ô and Õ communicating by time: Ô knows that Õ will support Ô's election for at least the next Ñ×Ø ¡ time units and Õ knows by waiting for Ñ×Ø time units that Ô will not use Õ's support anymore.
Note that if Ô would not reject slow support messages, it might be able to become leader at a time when the other processes already supported the election of another pro-cess. Hence, the detection of slow messages is important to enforce that there is at most one leader at a time. Note that if there were more than one leader, this might lead to the contamination of services depending on one unique leader. In other words, some undetected slow messages might lead to serious contamination problems in higher services.
Undetected slow messages might not only lead to contamination problems, they might also cause the invalidation of liveness properties. For example, recall that a process Õ only supports the election of a process Ô when Õ receives Ô's election-message Ñ as a fast message ( Figure  8 ). If Õ would not check that Ñ is fast, Õ could support the election of a process Ô that already gave up to become leader a long time ago. Since Õ has to wait for Ñ×Ø time units before it can support another process, processes have to avoid supporting slow election-messages. In particular, even when a majority Å of processes could communicate in a timely manner with each other, slow messages sent by processes outside of Å could prevent the election of a leader in Å . By discarding slow messages, the fail-aware datagram service enables the processes in Å to elect a leader in a bounded amount of time even when they receive slow election messages from outside of Å . In many of our protocols, the fail-aware datagram service helps to guarantee timeliness requirements even when slow messages arrive.
Process Control Example
The fail-aware datagram service can even be used to detect out-of-date information when messages are forwarded by one or more intermediate processes ( Figure 9 ). Let us assume that process Ô schedules to read its physical sensor every ¥ clock time units and sends the reading in a fail-aware message Ò to the controller process Õ (see pseudo-code in Figure 31 and Section 8.4 for further explanations of the pseudo-code). The controller has to make sure that the information contained in message Ò is up-to-date, that is, Ò is at most ¡ time units old. An implementation problem that arises is that it is possible for Ô to read its sensor at clock time , be preempted by the operating system for some time, and then be resumed again to send message Ò at clock time ( Figure 10 ). Process Õ has to make sure that the real-time duration´ µ is at most ¡ instead of only detecting the case that the duratioń µ is at most ¡. We solve this problem by virtually extending the transmission time of Ñ to´ µ: we allow processes that use the fail-aware datagram service to set the send time stamp of messages. Process Ô will thus set the send time stamp of Ò to , instead of using the default send time stamp .
A similar problem can occur at process Ö: Ö has to make sure that the commands sent by Õ are up-to-date in the sense that a command received in a message Ñ was generated no more than ¡ time units ago. The solution to
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Actuator Controller p q r Figure 9 : Process Ô reads periodically a local sensor, transmits the reading to Õ, who processes this information and transmits the result to Ö.
this problem is the same as above: Õ uses its receive time stamp of Ò as send time stamp of Ñ. Hence, performance failures that might occur between and can be detected by Ö because Ñ is delivered as a "slow" message when Ñ's "extended" transmission delay was greater than ¡. Process Ö can set a timer to make sure that it gets at least every ª clock time units a "fast" command message:
when a time-out event occurs, it has to switch to a failsafe mode. For example, when Ö would control the gates of a rail-way crossing, Ö would be implemented by a hard real-time thread (or, a thread and some simple hardware in case one does not have hard real-time threads), and Ö would lower the gates whenever it has to switch to failsafe mode because it has not received a "fast" command message for more than ª time units. In case one cannot use hard real-time threads, we described in [13] how a simple hardware circuit allows one to solve this problem even when Ö does not provide any real-time guarantees. ¡ and Ö has to detect when ¡. By using and instead of the default values and as send time stamps, the fail-aware datagram service allows Õ and Ö to detect these performance failures.
Service Specification
In this section, we give a specification of the fail-aware datagram service. To do this, we first introduce the primitives that this service provides to its clients.
Primitives
The fail-aware datagram service provides the following primitives to transmit unicast and broadcast messages:
fa-send(m,q): sends an unicast message Ñ to process Õ,
fa-broadcast(m):
broadcasts Ñ to all processes including the sender of Ñ, and fa-deliver(m,p,flag): is an upcall initiated by the failaware datagram service to deliver message Ñ sent by process Ô. The value of the flag can be either "slow" or "fast".
The classification of messages is based on the upper bound calculated at the reception of a message and the value of ¡. The relationship between the transmission delay of a message and its classification is hence as follows:
any message Ñ that is delivered as a "fast" message experienced an actual transmission delay of at most ¡ (see Figure 11 ), and any message that experienced a transmission delay of more than ¡ time units is delivered as a slow message (see Figure 12 ).
fa-deliver(m,p, ) realtime 
¡.
A broadcast message Ñ sent by a process Ô might be delivered as "slow" by some processes and as "fast" by other processes since the transmission delay of Ñ can vary for different processes. Other processes might not deliver Ñ at all because of an omission failure in the underlying datagram service.
So far, we have not given a requirement that determines when the service has to deliver a message as "fast". Ideally, we would like any message with a transmission delay of at most ¡ to be delivered as "fast" and any message with a transmission delay of more than ¡ to be delivered as "slow". The problem with this approach is that one cannot calculate a tight upper bound on one-way transmission delays (e.g. due to the natural drift of hardware clocks). ¡, it is delivered as a "slow" message.
To circumvent this impossibility, one could "cheat" in the following way. On the reception of a message Ñ, one determines an upper bound on the transmission delay of Ñ. If the upper bound indicates that Ñ's transmission delay is at most ¡, Ñ is delivered as "fast". Otherwise, Ñ's delivery is delayed until its transmission delay is definitely more than ¡. While this additional delay of slow messages is useful in some situations, we do not address this issue further since 1) some applications want to receive also slow messages as soon as possible, and 2) it is easy to provide such an additional delay on application level.
In this paper we want 1) to allow the fail-aware datagram service to be able to deliver messages as soon as they arrive, 2) to exclude trivial implementations that behave "correctly" by delaying all messages by ¡ and then delivering them as "slow". Hence, when specifying the service: 1) we allow a bounded uncertainty in the classification of messages 2) we tie the specification of "fast" to the bound AE given by the timed model to enforce that timely messages must be classified as "fast" (see Figure  13 ).
Let us consider that a fail-aware datagram service sends each message Ñ (i.e. an fa-message) as a message of the underlying asynchronous datagram service (a d-message). Again, one would ideally likē a timely d-message (with transmission delay at most AE) to be delivered as a "fast" fa-message, and a late d-message (i.e. its transmission delay is greater than AE) to be delivered as a "slow" fa-message.
As mentioned before, the problem with this goal is that a process cannot calculate a tight upper bound on the transmission delay of every message Ñ it receives. However, we show later that the error of the calculated upper bound for a message Ñ sent between connected processes can be bounded by a small constant Ñ Ü ¼.
We relax the above ideal goal: we require that any timely message between two connected processes be delivered as a fast message and any message that takes more than ¡ AE · Ñ Ü time units be delivered as slow. In what follows we assume ¡ AE · Ñ Ü holds, where the error constant Ñ Ü is defined in Section 8.3. We have to allow the fail-aware datagram service to deliver messages that experience a transmission delay within AE ¡℄ as either "slow" or "fast" according to the calculated upper bound (see Figure 13 ). 
Specification
To simplify our specification, we assume that each failaware datagram message is unique. For example, in the proposed protocol a sender × adds its id and the current value of its local hardware clock to each message it sends. Since correct clocks are strictly monotonic for successive readings, all messages are unique. We use the following predicates to denote fail-aware datagram service related events: Since a process cannot calculate a tight upper bound on the transmission delay of a message, we derive a relaxed timeliness requirement for our service. If processes Ô and Õ become connected at time × and stay connected until time Ø · ¡, all messages sent between Ô and Õ within × Ø℄ are timely. Since the processes need round-trip message pairs to calculate an upper bound on one-way message delays, at the start of the time interval × Ø℄, Ô and Õ might not have any message pair that can provide them with a good upper bound. Hence, we allow that, for some bounded time after becoming connected, two processes may erroneously deliver some timely messages as "slow". We therefore only require that all timely messages sent between Ô and Õ during an interval × · Ø℄ be delivered as "fast" (instead of requiring that all timely messages sent between Ô and Õ during interval × Ø℄ be delivered as "fast"). Note that even though a process is sometimes allowed to deliver a timely message as "slow", a fail-aware datagram service is never permitted to deliver a message with a transmission delay greater than ¡ as "fast".
fa-deliver
We use a notation similar to that of [17] to specify the failaware datagram service. Each occurrence of variable " " denotes a distinct unnamed, universally quantified variable similar to those used in Prolog. The properties that a fail-aware datagram service should satisfy are defined as follows:
Validity: Only if a process Õ has sent a message Ñ to a process Ô, message Ñ and the identity of Õ will be delivered to Ô. Ô Õ Ñ Ø: fa-deliver
Non-duplication:
Messages are delivered at most once.
Ô Ñ × Ø: 
Discussion
Note that our timeliness requirement does not prescribe that processes send periodically messages to each other. However, to implement the timeliness requirement, a protocol might have to make sure that processes send each other messages. The information that a process Ô has about process Õ's clock ages with time, hence they must exchange messages at least every, say , time units. This does not mean though that the fail-aware datagram protocol itself has to periodically exchange such messages. If the message traffic between Ô and Õ is sufficiently rich, no periodic messages are ever sent on behalf of the protocol.
Our specification does not require that an fa-message carried by a late d-message be actually delivered to the destination process. Typically, a fail-aware datagram service will deliver each fa-message Ñ unless the underlying datagram drops the d-message carrying Ñ. In our specification we do not want to exclude service implementations that drop some late messages to shed the load during high load situations. Another reason for not requiring that all late fa-messages be delivered is that UDP does not guarantee that a message is delivered at most once [18] : to enforce at most once delivery semantics, the information that a message has already been delivered has to be kept for only ¡ time units when the service drops all messages with a transmission delay greater than ¡.
Protocol
In this section, we propose a protocol for the fail-aware datagram service. The validity and non-duplication requirements of the fail-aware datagram service are already satisfied by the underlying asynchronous datagram service (assumption of the timed asynchronous system model). We therefore restrict ourselves to describe the implementation of the fail-awareness and the timeliness requirements. The proposed protocol sends all fa-messages as d-messages to which it adds some protocol-specific information. The fail-awareness requirement is implemented using an approach similar to that of probabilistic remote clock reading [1] : a process Ô computes for each d-message Ñ it receives an upper bound on the transmission time by measuring on its local clock the duration of an asynchronous datagram round-trip which includes Ñ.
Upper Bound
To implement the fail-aware datagram service, a process Õ that receives a message Ñ has to calculates an upper bound Ù ´Ñµ on the transmission delay Ø ´Ñµ of Ñ (see Figure 14) . For local messages an upper bound can be computed in the following way: when a process Ô sends a message Ñ to itself with send time stamp and receive time stamp , the transmission delay of Ñ can be bounded by (see ℄ (see Figure 16 ):
realtime
The minimum transmission delay of any remote message is at least AE Ñ Ò . Hence, the length of interval
An upper bound for the transmission delay Ø ´Ñµ can be derived by using an upper bound for the length of the interval ℄ and lower bounds for the intervals ℄ and ℄ (see Figure 16 ):
realtime Figure 16 : The transmission delay Ø ´Ñµ is bounded by calculating an upper bound for the length of ℄ and lower bounds for the length of ℄ and ℄.
We define the upper bound Ù Ò´Ñ µ calculated by Õ on Ø ´Ñµ using message Ò as follows:
To be able to calculate that upper bound, each process Ô stores for any other process Õ the send and receive time stamp of some message Ò that Ô has received from Õ (Figure 17) . Each process Ô maintains two arrays ËÌ Ô and ÊÌ Ô such that entry ËÌ Ô´Õ µ contains the send time stamp of Ò and ÊÌ Ô´Õ µ the receive time stamp of Ò. The time stamps are determined by the local hardware clocks of the processes: when process Õ has sent Ò at real-time and Ô has received Ò at real-time , then ËÌ Ô´Õ µ À Õ´ µ (9) ÊÌ Ô´Õ µ À Ô´ µ Each process Ô that wants to send an unicast message Ñ to some process Õ sends together with Ñ the send and receive time stamp of some message Ò that Ô has received from Õ and the send time stamp of Ñ (see Figure 17 ). Process Õ can then use the time stamps of the round-trip consisting of messages Ò and Ñ to calculate an upper bound on the transmission delay of Ñ. When process Ô broadcasts a message Ñ, it includes arrays ËÌ Ô and ÊÌ Ô to allow all process to extract the time-stamps of a round-trip message pair (see Figure 18 ). To reduce the information piggy-backed on broadcast messages, our implementation of a fail-aware datagram service only piggy-backs the two arrays on "helper"-messages (see below). All other broadcast messages only piggy-back the send time stamp . This reduction in message size however requires that each process Õ maintains an additional array that stores two additional time-stamps ( and ) for each remote process Ô. 
Update of Time Stamps
Let us assume that process Õ has stored the receive and send time stamps ¼ ËÌ Õ´Ô µ and ¼ ÊÌ Õ´Ô µ of some message Ñ ¼ sent to Õ by Ô (Figure 19 ). When Õ receives a message Ñ with time stamps and from Ô, it updates its entries ËÌ Õ´Ô µ and ÊÌ Õ´Ô µ. The simplest solution would be to just store the time stamps from the most recently received message Ñ. However, this solution could increase the calculated upper bound for any message Ò that Õ will send to Ô with respect to the upper bound determined by the time stamps of Ñ ¼ . We can quantify the difference between the two upper bounds Ù Ñ´Ò µ and Ù Ñ ¼´Òµ in the following way:
Process Õ will thus replace the time stamps of Ñ ¼ by the time stamps of Ñ iff Ñ will guarantee a lower upper bound for any future message Ò that Õ will send to Ô. Hence, Õ will perform this replacement iff Ù Ñ´Ò µ Ù Ñ ¼´Òµ which is equivalent to Figure 19 : Process Õ determines at the reception of a new message Ñ from Ô if the time stamps of Ñ could provide tighter upper bounds for messages that Õ will send to Ô than the ones of Ñ ¼ .
Error of Upper Bound
We define the error Ò´Ñ µ of the upper bound Ù Ò´Ñ µ on the message transmission delay Ø ´Ñµ as follows (see Figure 14) :
Since Ù Ò´Ñ µ is an upper bound on Ø ´Ñµ, Ò´Ñ µ is never negative, i.e. Ò´Ñ µ ¼. To simplify the derivation of an upper bound for Ò´Ñ µ, let us assume that the drift Ô of process Ô's hardware clock À Ô is constant (for the time interval we consider), i.e. Ô ¾ ℄ and let the drift Õ ¾ ℄ of À Õ also be constant. The transmission delay Ø ´Ñµ can therefore be expressed as follows (see Figure 16 ): (15) This equation shows that the error can grow up to times the distance between the reception of Ò at clock time and the transmission of Ñ at clock time (see Figure  16) . Hence, to reduce the error made in calculating an upper bound on the transmission delays of messages, we have to make sure that each process Ô gets a periodic message from each connected process Õ. We can ensure that by requiring that each timely process Õ broadcasts at least every, say, clock time units a message (see Figure 20) . Note that typically clients of a fail-aware datagram service, such as a group membership or clock synchronization service do periodic broadcasts anyway to all other processes. Thus, if clients send broadcast messages with a frequency of at least ½ , the fail-aware datagram service is silent, in the sense that, it only transmits messages it was requested to send by its clients. To calculate an upper bound on Ò´Ñ µ for connected processes, let us consider two processes Ô and Õ that are connected, i.e. the transmission delay of any message sent between Ô and Õ is at most AE and the two processes send each other messages at least every clock time units. Let Ò ½ denote the message associated with the time stamps ËÌ Ô´Õ µ and ÊÌ Ô´Õ µ and let Ñ be a message that Ô sends to Õ at time (see Figure 21) . Furthermore, let Ò ¾ be the next message from Õ to Ô after Ò ½ . Assume Ò ¾ arrives just after Ô has sent Ñ: for simplicity, let us assume Ò ¾ arrives at time .
Let Ü denote the real-time duration between the send times of messages Ò ½ and Ò ¾ (see Figure 21 ). Since Õ is timely and sends messages at least every clock time units, Ü is bounded by: The times , , and can be expressed relative to using the transmission delays of the messages Ò ½ , Ò ¾ , and Ñ and the duration Ü:
· Ø ´Ò ½ µ (17) · Ü · Ø ´Ò ¾ µ (18) · Ü · Ø ´Ò ¾ µ · Ø ´Ñµ (19) Note that the transmission delays of messages Ò ½ , Ò ¾ , and Ñ are bounded by AE because we assumed that Ô and Õ are connected:
Since the maximum drift rate of hardware clocks is very small, the following properties hold
The drift rate of Ô's and Õ's hardware clock is bounded by, The protocol classifies all messages with a calculated upper bound of at most ¡ as "fast" and all other messages as "slow". To guarantee the Timeliness requirement, we have to define ¡ such that ¡ AE · Ñ Ü , that is:
This ensures that the calculated upper bound for Ñ is at most ¡:
Because it takes at most ´½· µ·AE time units until process Ô receives a message from some connected process Õ (see Figure 21 ), the timeliness requirement is satisfied for constant
The fail-awareness requirement is satisfied because (1) a message Ñ is classified as "slow" whenever the calculated bound Ù Ò´Ñ µ is more than ¡, and (2) Ù Ò´Ñ µ is always greater than the actual transmission delay Ø ´Ñµ.
Pseudo-Code
The pseudo-code of the protocol described above is given in Figures 29 and 30 . The asynchronous datagram service assumed by the timed asynchronous system model provides operations to send, to broadcast, and to deliver messages: we denote these operations by the functions send and broadcast, and the upcall event deliver. The system provides alarm clocks that allow each process Ô to set alarms: operation SetAlarm(T) tries to wake up Ô within of Ô's hardware clock displaying value Ì . Process Ô is never awakened before À Ô´Ø µ Ì but Ô can suffer a performance failure, that is, Ô can be awaken when À Ô´Ø µ Ì · . The process management service generates an event ÙÔ Ø Ï Í Ô´Ì µ to inform Ô of the alarm Ì of the alarm clock ÙÔ Ø . An alarm clock stores only the last alarm time, i.e. setting a new alarm Í before the system informed Ô of a previous alarm Ì will cancel the previous alarm of the alarm clock.
The operations fa-send and fa-broadcast allow clients to pass the send time stamp as an optional argument (see also Section 6): when no time stamp is specified, the current value of the hardware clock (denoted by function À´µ) is used as send time stamp. The transmission delay of a message Ñ is the duration between the real-time when the sender determines the send time stamp of Ñ and the realtime when the receiver process reads its hardware clock to determine the receive time stamp of Ñ.
Note that our protocol naturally tolerates message omission failures. To see why, consider Figure 16 with messages Ñ and Ò. 
Implementation
Our implementation of a fail-aware datagram service on a cluster of SUN workstations provides some additional functionality that is useful for some clients. In particular, the receiver of a message Ñ can get the calculated upper bound of Ñ as well as the send and receive time stamps of Ñ. Returning the calculated upper bound instead of simply returning the "fast" or "slow" Boolean, allows each client to select its own ¡ (it is reasonable to expect that different clients of the fail-aware datagram service use different ¡s).
The implementation increases the lower bound AE Ñ Ò of message transmission delays with increasing message sizes (see Section 9) . This allows the protocol to calculate a better upper bound for the message transmission delays of long messages. Note that the service can set AE Ñ Ò to zero whenever no better lower bound is known. In particular, that allows an installation of a fail-aware datagram service on various platforms without preliminary performance measurements. However, to calculate a better upper bound, one has to provide a better lower bound for the transmission delays of messages.
Our implementation minimizes the length of messages by piggy-backing only one to three time-stamps on a message sent by a client: a broadcast message contains only the send-time stamp , while an unicast messages contains three time stamps , , (see Figure 17 for the labeling of the time stamps). Only helper-messages which are broadcasted at least every clock time units by the service contain the complete send and receive time stamp arrays ËÌ and ÊÌ . Furthermore, the helper-messages are sent together with the higher level membership messages (whenever a membership service is activated) to reduce the number of messages transmitted.
Another issue we address in our implementation are asymmetric disconnection failures: a process Ô can send messages but it cannot receive messages 1 . When Ô has never received a message from Õ, Õ will compute an infinite upper bound for all messages it receives from Õ because there exists no round-trip that allows the computation of an upper bound. Our implementation uses an expiration time after which the time stamps in ËÌ Ô Õ℄ and ÊÌ Ô Õ℄ have to be replaced by the time stamps of a new messages Ñ even when Ñ does not guarantee better bounds (see Section 8.2). Process Õ that receives a message from Ô delivers messages as slow when the piggybacked time stamps and are expired. In other words, in a bounded amount of time after process Ô failed to receive messages from some process Õ, Õ will deliver all messages from Ô as slow, allowing its clients to reject these messages and to transform the one-way connection into a symmetric disconnection. Lack of transitivity for the connected relation is another source of instability that we resolve at the fail-aware membership abstraction level [12] .
Performance
We measured the performance of our protocol on the network of SUN IPX workstations linked by a 10Mbps Ethernet at our Dependable Systems Laboratory at UCSD. In the first measurement we determine the round-trip message transmission times for four different message sizes ( Figure 22 ): a process Õ sends periodically a message Ò to another process Ô and Ô replies with a message Ñ of the same size as Ò. The measurements shown in Figure  22 determine the round-trip time´ µ ´ µ for four different message sizes, where are the time stamps of Ò and Ñ as given in Figure 17 .
The minimum round-trip time increases with the size of the messages sent (see Figure 23) . Our implementation of a fail-aware datagram service adapts the lower bound AE Ñ Ò of the transmission of messages to the size of the messages transmitted. The increase of the minimum round-trip time for a message size above 1472Bytes is due to the fact that UDP has to split these messages into two Ethernet packets.
The transmission time of broadcast messages is slightly greater than that of unicast messages (Figure 24) . The only difference to the above measurements is that the messages are sent as UDP broadcasts instead of UDP unicasts. The increase in transmission time is consistent with the measurements performed by others [16] . To exclude that this increase is due to the processing of the local loopback messages, we also measured the round-trip times when the replies to a broadcast message by the remote process Ô are artificially delayed, i.e. we increased time . However, that delay did not show any improvement on the round-trip times´ µ ´ µ.
To calculate better upper bounds for broadcast messages, our implementation uses different lower bounds for broadcast and unicast messages (Figure 25 ).
The next measurement shows an upper bound on the error of the upper bounds calculated for unicast messages .25kB .5kB 1kB 1.4kB 7.5kB message size ( Figure 26 ). We used two processes that sent each other "ping-pong" messages. The figure shows the difference between the calculated upper bound and the minimum message transmission delay AE Ñ Ò . In this measurement, we used the upper bounds of 100,000 unicast messages each with a length of 248 bytes.
We also performed measurements of the upper bounds calculated by the fail-aware datagram service used by a local leadership service [15] . This measurement involved one process Ô periodically broadcasting messages and another process Õ is immediately replying to Ô with a unicast message. Figure 27 shows the distribution of the upper bounds calculated by Ô for Õ's replies.
The next measurement involved six processes. We include this measurement to illustrate that the communica- tion pattern of an application can (of course) affect the message transmission delays. This measurement is also based on the local leader election protocol: one process Ô is periodically broadcasting messages and five other processes are replying immediately to Ô. After receiving a reply, Ô first processes this reply before it receives the next reply. Hence, the transmission delays of a reply message increases by the processing time of the preceding reply messages. This is the reason for the the five peaks in the graph (see Figure 28 ). 
Conclusion
One problem in designing protocols for distributed systems is that undetected slow messages can invalidate safety properties. Thus, it is important to detect slow messages. For example, a slow message Ñ from a sensor has to be rejected since the information of Ñ might be out-ofdate. In this paper , we described a fail-aware datagram service that allows the detection of slow messages by tagging each message it delivers as either "fast" or "slow". Any message that is delivered as "fast" has a transmission delay of at most ¡ time units and hence, any message with a transmission delay of more than ¡ time units is delivered as "slow".
Our implementation of a fail-aware datagram service calculates an upper bound on the transmission delay of each message it delivers. This implementation piggy-backs at most three time-stamps on each message it transmits for a client. To support fa-broadcast messages, a server Ô has to make sure that it periodically transmits two time stamps ( , , see Figure 17 ) to each connected process Õ. In typical applications the service piggy-backs that information on messages sent by higher level services, such as membership, and thus, does not have to send any additional messages. Effectively, the service establishes a pairwise clock synchronization between connected processes. This is achievable even in systems that can partition.
We showed how a fail-aware datagram service can be used by processes to communicate by time. The failaware datagram service is the foundation of several other fail-aware services that we have designed (e.g [13] ), such as fail-aware clock synchronization, fail-aware membership and fail-aware atomic broadcast. The datagram service has been proven useful in the design of safety critical distributed systems [7] .
